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PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY IN TEXAS
by
James B. Sales*
T HE Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing pre-trial discovery direct-
ly affect every attorney engaged in a litigation oriented practice. It is
impossible to handle properly any litigation without utilizing the tools of
discovery. Preparation is the hallmark of any successful litigation, and the
effective use of pre-trial discovery is the foundation of that preparation.
Recent amendments to the Texas rules have substantially liberalized the
ambit of discovery. The reach of discovery, however, is neither unfettered
nor undefined. It is important, therefore, to understand the parameters of
discovery as well as the limitations imposed by traditional testimonial
privileges.
This Article reviews both the scope and limits of pre-trial discovery in
order to assist in clarifying the current status of discovery procedures.
Further, this Article identifies those areas in which the nature of the rules
themselves or recent Texas Supreme Court decisions have generated confu-
sion in applying the rules.
I. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS
A. General Considerations
Rule 167 provides that upon a motion showing good cause, any party may
seek production of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things which constitute or contain,
or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of, evidence material to
any issue.' Rule 167 further authorizes entry upon designated lands for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property
or any designated object or operation which may be located on the property.
Despite the broad categorization of matters amenable to production under
the rule, the traditional Texas rules of testimonial privilege impose limits on
the scope of discovery. 2
Motions for production under rule 167 may be made at any stage of a
proceeding.' Consequently, a party may file a motion for production at any
time after appearance by the party upon whom the motion is served. 4
Although this rule contemplates discovery during the pre-trial stage, a re-
* B.S., LL.M., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167. See generally Ramsay v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 498 S.W.2d
741 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dismissed w.o.j., 417 U.S. 939
(1974).
2. See, e.g., Allen v. Humphreys, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977).
3. Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Dunlap v. Chase, 336 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, no writ).
4. Dunlap v. Chase, 336 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, no writ).
1017
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
quest for production may be initiated during trial.5 This means, of course,
that the trial court may order production of authorized items of discovery at
any time during the trial.6 Substantial discretion is accorded the trial court in
determining the propriety of ordering production of nonprivileged and rele-
vant documents and things, both at the pre-trial stage and during trial.
The application of rule 167 is limited to the parties involved in the cause of
action. 7 The operative effect of a motion for production cannot be extended
to non-parties. Similarly, the provisions of rule 167 do not apply to criminal
matters such as a habeas corpus proceeding to secure bail on a criminal
charge.'
The documents or things to be produced must be within the possession,
control, or custody of a party;9 there is not, however, a requirement that the
documents or things be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Cus-
tody and control, not geographical location within the state, is thus the
critical test.' 0 Consequently, a party may be compelled to produce au-
thorized documents and things which may presently reside in the custody or
actual possession of any employee, agent, attorney, or other intermediary.
The determinative factor is the right of control over the matter sought for
production.
A showing of good cause is essential for the production of documents or
things. Rule 167 specifically requires that the motion of any party seeking
production must establish good cause. Despite substantial liberalization of
rule 167 precipitated by the 1973 amendments, the supreme court retained,
as a predicate for production, the requirement of good cause." Under the
comparable federal rule, good cause was eliminated as a prerequisite for
production. 2 Pursuant to the good cause requirement, the party moving for
production is obligated to establish that the information sought is not other-
wise available and that the documents and things are material or relevant to
some issue involved in the litigation.13 The Texas Supreme Court decision in
Carroll Cable Co. v. Miller, ' 4 approving an order for production of an
insuring agreement, seemed to relax the standard necessary to satisfy a
showing of good cause. In that case, however, relaxation of the good cause
standard was apparently motivated, to some degree, by the provision of rule
5. Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(court possesses the power, without formal motion or subpoena, to order production during
trial).
6. McGregor v. Gordon, 442 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
7. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167 states: "the court in which an action is pending may order any partyI I See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no
writ).
8. Ex parte Davis, 542 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
9. See, e.g., Cutler v. Gulf States Util. Co., 361 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. Cf. Hasting Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950); Brown v.
Lundell, 334 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960), aff'd, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863
(1961); Robb v. Gilmore, 302 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(the court may also order inspection or tests of objects and other things).
Ii. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167 specifies that "upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor and upon notice to all parties ..
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
13. See Gulf Constr. Co. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 24 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1959); Cutler v.
Gulf States Util. Co., 361 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. 501 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1973).
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167 specifically designating insuring agreements to be subject to prod-
uction. 15
In the subsequent case of Exparte Shepperd16 the supreme court reaffirm-
ed the continued vitality of the good cause requirement in a case not
involving an insuring agreement. Thus, a showing of good cause continues
to be essential and circumscribes the prerogative of the court to order
production of documents or things. In Shepperd the supreme court empha-
sized the importance of establishing the good cause predicate, noting,
"while the Rule specifically authorizes discovery of expert reports, it con-
tains general qualifications that the party seeking discovery must show
'good cause' . . . ." 7 Consequently, the moving party must affirmatively
demonstrate to the trial court by both sufficient pleadings and proof the
need for and the materiality of the matters sought for production.' 8
Further, the court must expressly find the existence of need and mate-
riality. The mere ministerial granting of production in the absence of a
finding of need and materiality contravenes the good cause requirement.' 9 In
considering good cause under federal rule 35, the United States Supreme
Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder observed:
[Good cause is] not met by mere conclusionary allegations of the
pleadings-nor by mere relevance to the case-but require[s] an affir-
mative showing by the movant that each condition as to which the
examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that
good cause exists for ordering each particular examination. . . .The
ability of movant to obtain the desired information by other means is
also relevant.20
Similarly, in Irwin v. Basham21 the plaintiff sought production from the
defendant of various sales schedules and income tax returns in connection
with a suit for profits allegedly resulting from an oral real estate transaction.
Concluding that the trial court properly denied the request for production,
the court noted:
No facts were either pleaded or proved that such good cause existed. A
party does not show himself entitled to a discovery order simply by
asking for it. A mere conclusion in the motion as to the need for
discovery is not sufficient. Sufficient facts must be alleged to enable the
trial court to see the need as well as the materiality of what is sought.
15. Id.
16. 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974).
17. Id. at 815 (emphasis added). In finding that the movants had satisfied the requirement
the court stated, "The condemnees contend the reports are material for purposes of cross-
examination and impeachment of the appraisers when they testify at the trial. We agree ...
This information generally would not be available to the landowners from other sources. Thus,
the good cause and materiality requirements are satisfied ...... Id. at 815-16.
18. Bryan v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 553 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1977, no writ); Irwin v. Basham, 507 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Zuider Zee Oyster Bar, Inc. v. Martin, 503 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973", writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1962); Ramsay v. Santa Rosa Medical Center,
498 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dismissed w.o.j.,
417 U.S. 939 (1974).
20. 379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964). See Narro Warehouse, Inc. v. Kelley, 530 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (merely pleading the conclusion that good
cause exists for the production of documents is insufficient).
21. 507 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Moreover, such facts must be proved; the granting of such a motion is
not automatic upon request.22
The burden of establishing both need and materiality is therefore imposed
on the moving party. Although the matters sought for production are proper-
ly discoverable, improper pleading of the need for and the materiality of
those matters is fatal.
2 3
Originally, rule 167 limited discovery to documents which constituted or
contained evidence material to the matters in litigation. 24 This limitation on
the scope of production was substantially modified by the 1973 amendment.
Production is now justified if the documents or things involved constitute or
contain or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence
material to any matter involved in the pending litigation. 25 This latter modifi-
cation has greatly extended the ambit of permissible discovery. Tests and
surveys not otherwise relevant to any issue in the pending litigation may be
subject to production because of the likelihood that such information would
lead to discovery of relevant and admissible evidence. 26 Obviously, this
effectively enlarges the discretionary prerogative of the trial court in deter-
mining the existence of good cause for production. The supreme court in
Allen v. Humphreys concluded:
Rule 167 does not require as a prerequisite to discovery that the items
sought to be discovered be admissible into evidence. It is enough that
the documents in question be 'reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of' evidence material to the cause of action. Furthermore, the
above-described complaints and answers might well establish a pattern
of disease and for that reason are relevant on the issue of causation.
Thus the documents are material to the issue of causation, and, together
with their unavailability from any other source, this suffices to show
good cause for their production. 27
B. Information Subject to Production
Rule 167 contemplates discovery of documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things which constitute or contain,
or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of, evidence material to
any matter involved in the action. In the absence of traditional rules of
testimonial privilege, these designated items must be disgorged upon a
proper motion.
Rule 167 has been interpreted to authorize the production of the income
22. Id. at 625.
23. In Texhoma Stores, Inc. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court specifically noted that movant failed to satisfy
his burden of establishing good cause "in the absence of both allegation and proof of fact...
why the requested information is material to issues involved."
24. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167 (1948).
25. Statutory provisions may, however, extend a privilege exempting certain items from
discovery. See Texarkana Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1977),
holding that records and proceedings of any hospital committee, medical organization commit-
tee, or extended care facility are privileged under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d, § 3
(Vernon 1969) and thereby protected from production.
26. See, e.g., Allen v. Humphreys, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977); Texhoma Stores,
Inc. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
27. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469, 472 (July 20, 1977).
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tax returns of a party. 28 Income tax returns in a generic sense have been
judicially denominated as beyond the shield of testimonial privilege and are
subject to discovery. 29 Tax returns are particularly pertinent in suits for
damages on the issue of lost wages or loss of earning capacity. The fact that
a party no longer possesses a copy of previously filed tax returns does not
relieve him from the duty to comply with a production order. A party may be
required to obtain income tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. A party, as a taxpayer, is deemed to have constructive custody of and
control over returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service. a0
The entire income tax return, however, is not per se discoverable. 31 The
trial court is obligated to separate the relevant and material portions of the
tax return from the irrelevant and immaterial.3 2 Indeed, the failure of the
trial court to examine and separate the material matters from the immaterial
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 33
The rule now expressly provides for production of any insurance agree-
ment under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be
liable to satisfy a judgment entered in an action, or to reimburse or in-
demnify for payments made to satisfy a judgment. Previously, insuring
agreements were not discoverable under rule 167. 34 The provision now in
effect was patterned after federal rule 26(b)(2) which has been consistently
interpreted to permit discovery of the entire insuring agreement, including
policy limits. 35 The federal rule, however, unlike its Texas counterpart, was
modified by deletion of the good cause requirement. Because both need and
materiality constitute the quintessence of good cause, a question was raised
as to whether this provision was sufficiently broad to justify disclosure of
policy limits. This concern was prompted by an earlier opinion of the Texas
Supreme Court that policy limits were not material, in advance of trial, to
any issue involved in a tort action. 36 In Carroll Cable Co. v. Miller37 the
court resolved the question in favor of disclosure. In defining good cause in
relation to insuring agreements, the court announced: "It is sufficient show-
ing of good cause that an insurance agreement is not available to the moving
party and that the information is needed to determine settlement and litiga-
tion strategy." 3 8 Thus, while the rule contains a general good cause require-
ment, the allegations deemed sufficient to satisfy the requirement in Carroll
obviate any real showing of need and materiality for obtaining production of
insuring agreements. An allegation that the policy is not available and is
28. Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1962); Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328
S.W.2d 434 (1959); Lloyds v. Hale, 405 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
29. Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959).
30. See generally Tollefsen v. Phillips, 16 F.R.D. 348 (D. Mass. 1954); Reeves v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 80 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1948).
31. Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1962).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1969).
35. See, e.g., Ballard v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Grise v.
Crownover, 57 F.R.D. 210 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Clower v. Walters, 51 F.R.D. 288 (S.D. Ala.
1970).
36. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1969).




needed to plan settlement and litigation strategy suffices. Liberalization of
the requirements for disclosure of insuring agreements was designed to
foster a climate for settlement and thereby reduce the volume of litigation.
Unfortunately, the accessibility of this information has produced some
problems. 39
The relaxed standard for good cause defined in Carroll Cable Co. appar-
ently has been limited to the unique item of the insuring agreement. In other
situations the good cause requirement and the concomitant obligation to
plead and prove need for and materiality of items has been reaffirmed by the
supreme court. 40
The identity and location of any potential party or witness may now be
obtained from communications or other papers in the possession, custody,
or control of a party. Prior to the 1973 amendments the supreme court in Ex
parte Ladon4" determined that the attorney for a bus company was not
required to produce a list of passengers compiled by the bus driver following
an accident. This decision was predicated on the traditional privilege accord-
ed post-occurrence communications. Although this general privilege re-
mains, rule 167 now specifically eliminates from this privileged status any
communications which reflect the identity and location of potential parties
or witnesses.
Traditionally, expert witness opinions and reports were protected against
discovery. The reports of experts employed by a party were judicially
recognized to be privileged; 42 the written reports of technical experts qual-
ified as communications between a party and its agent made subsequent to
an occurrence and in connection with the prosecution or defense of a claim,
and thus were privileged. 43
Currently, however, the rule provides for the production of the reports of
experts expected to be called as witnesses. This modifies the rule articulated
in State v. Ashworth" that a written appraisal report was protected from
disclosure during the pre-trial stage. This change represents an awareness of
the realities of complex litigation involving the use of highly technical
witnesses to provide sophisticated opinions and conclusions. The disclosure
of expert witness reports in advance of trial allows the adverse party to
investigate the basis of experts' opinions and to prepare an effective cross-
examination. Effective cross-examination represents the only adequate
means to test the validity of the opinions and conclusions of experts ex-
pressed on subjects that are beyond the knowledge and common under-
39. The Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement to the Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1970), observed
that information concerning insurance coverage will conduce settlement and avoid protracted
litigation in some cases, but in others it may have an opposite effect.
40. Allen v. Humphreys, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977). See also the discussion of
Exparte Shepperd, 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974), at notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
41. 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959); accord, Perez v. San Antonio Transit Co., 342
S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd).
42. State v. Ashworth, 484 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1972); Hodges v. State, 403 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shirley v. Dalby, 384 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Sales, Discovery Problems in Aviation
Litigation, 38 J. AIR L. & COMM. 297 (1972).




standing of the ordinary layman. For this reason, the reports of experts
expected to testify are now discoverable in advance of trial, subject to a
showing of good cause.4 5
The reports of experts retained by a party for consultation only in pending
litigation and not for the purpose of providing testimony at the trial are not
discoverable even upon a showing of good cause. Since rule 167 simply
excludes from the post-occurrence communications privilege only the writ-
ten reports of experts expected to testify, the reports of non-testifying
experts continue to qualify as written communications of an agent employed
by a party and made in connection with the prosecution or defense of a
claim.46 The modification of the post-occurrence communication provision
rather than the wholesale abrogation of the entire testimonial privilege
confirms this conclusion. Moreover, retention of the testimonial privilege of
the non-testifying consultant comports with the rationale undergirding the
change. If discovery of expert reports in advance of trial is intended to
facilitate preparation for effective cross-examination of technical witnesses,
disclosure of reports of consulting specialists who will not furnish evidence
in the litigation is unwarranted. The real concern motivating the rule modifi-
cation was the avoidance of trial by ambush; the ambush never materializes
if the expert consultant does not assume the role of a participant in the trial.
Contemporaneously with its modification of the testimonial privilege that
protected expert witness reports, the supreme court, in the rule governing
the scope of oral examination of witnesses, specifically retained the testimo-
nial privilege with respect to the conclusions and opinions of experts em-
ployed solely for consultation.47 The same rationale governed retention of
the protective shield for consultants. The obvious problem engendered by
the distinction between an expert witness and a consulting expert involves
the standard for characterizing the expert.
The problem of defining an "expert witness" was initially confronted in
Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Cunningham48 which involved a suit to recover
damages for negligent performance of a foundation investigation and pave-
ment design. The defendant filed a motion for production of the written
reports of several experts who had been employed by the plaintiff to ex-
amine and evaluate the paving problem. The attorney for the plaintiff
responded by sworn answer that the experts were used solely for consulta-
tion and would not be called as witnesses, except perhaps for rebuttal
purposes. After an in-camera examination, the trial court ordered produc-
tion of the requested reports. After reviewing the historical evolution of rule
45. Colonial Airlines v. Janas, 13 F.R.D. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (good cause not established
where material forming the basis of expert's report was available to adverse party). Contra,
Franks v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (court ordered prod-
uction of expert's report on analysis of shortening which exploded, apparently ignoring admoni-
tion of the Supreme Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), which stressed
importance of showing of good cause when that requirement was still incorporated in the
federal rule).
46. See generally State v. Ashworth, 484 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1972).
47. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a. In Ex parte Shepperd, 513 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. 1974), the
supreme court observed that "the clear policy enumerated in the Rules [is] that the opinions of
experts used solely for consultation should be shielded from discovery .
48. 502 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973).
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167, the supreme court concluded that the plaintiff was not required to
produce the reports of experts who would not be called as witnesses but was
obligated to produce the reports of experts who potentially might be utilized
for rebuttal. The supreme court, interpreting the intent and meaning of rule
167, declared:
As stated, Houdaille has disclaimed by sworn answer that Spencer
Buchanan and the experts of Shilstone Testing Laboratory will be
called as witnesses; it follows that their reports are not discoverable.
In this connection, Houdaille states in its affidavits and answers to
the motion for discovery that while it may not utilize the experts of
Bayou Industries, Inc., as witnesses in chief, it may do so for rebuttal
or impeachment purposes. It insists that the reports of such witnesses
are also protected from discovery under these circumstances. The 1973
amendments suggest no exception in this respect, and we hold that none
was intended. Their clear purport is to protect a party utilizing the
assistance of experts from discovery of their reports only when they
will not be used as a witness, whether in chief or otherwise. 49
Underscoring the rationale which prompted the change in rule 167, the
supreme court emphasized that protection from discovery is accorded the
conclusions and opinions of experts only when such experts will not be
utilized as witnesses, whether in chief or otherwise. In the absence of an
unequivocal disclaimer that experts employed by a party will not be called as
witnesses at trial, the reports of such experts are subject to production. The
court further clarified the disclaimer requirement by holding that a party is
not authorized to defer a decision characterizing an expert as either a
witness or a consultant.50 Since the underlying intent of the rule contem-
plates providing a party an adequate opportunity to prepare an effective
cross-examination of technical witnesses, failure to make the election at the
time the motion for production is filed would frustrate the purpose of the
rule. Consequently, an unqualified sworn disclaimer is required to invoke
the privilege against disclosure by consulting experts.
The decision in Houdaille recognizes that the testimonial privilege against
pre-trial production extends only to experts not expected to be called as
witnesses at the trial.5" This is consistent with the rationale underlying the
amendments since the need to possess the opinions and conclusions of
technical witnesses to prepare an effective cross-examination or rebuttal is
absent when the expert will not participate in the trial. Nevertheless, the
decision to denominate an expert as a consultant must be made at the time
discovery is initiated and the decision must be unqualified and categorical.
This was emphasized in Barker v. Dunham,52 in which the expert was
questioned on deposition regarding his opinion on the failure of a crane
boom. The witness was instructed not to answer on the basis that the
attorney had not yet decided whether to utilize the witness as an expert at
trial. In ordering discovery of the expert's opinion the supreme court stated:
49. Id. at 548.
50. Id.
5I. Id. (disclaimer by a party that expert would not be called as witness shielded the reports
from pre-trial production). But see Comment, Discovery of Experts'Reports in Texas, 28 Sw.
L.J. 617 (1974), suggesting that the supreme court ignored other compelling reasons for
expanding rather than limiting the scope of discovery.
52. 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977).
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American Hoist [defendant] has neither disclaimed an intention to
call him as a witness nor asserted that he will be 'used solely for
consultation.' Where a party does not positively aver that the expert in
question will be 'used solely for consultation' and will not be called as a
witness at the trial, the policy of allowing broad discovery in civil cases
is furthered by permitting discovery of that expert's reports, factual
observations, and opinions.5 3
Defining a "consulting expert" has likewise created confusion. This issue
was also considered by the supreme court in Barker.54 Plaintiff's husband
was fatally injured when a crane boom failed and collapsed. The plaintiff
sought through deposition to elicit the opinions and conclusions of the vice-
president in charge of engineering for the manufacture of the crane. Al-
though the vice-president was a qualified structural engineer and had ex-
amined the crane and formulated opinions on the cause of the collapse, the
attorney for the manufacturer refused to allow him to express any expert
opinions. The court ordered the vice-president to furnish his opinions since
he had not been unequivocally declared to be a consulting expert. Signifi-
cantly, however, the court observed:
The initial question here is whether the authorized discovery proce-
dures apply to the witness Montgomery, an officer and regular employ-
ee of American Hoist and therefore not an 'expert' specially employed
for consultation. The rules draw no distinction between an expert who
is a regular employee and one who is temporarily employed to aid in the
preparation of a claim or defense, and we thus hold the procedures
authorized by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply to Mont-
gomery. 51
The Barker decision extends the characterization of expert witness or
consulting expert to an officer or employee of a party. Normally, any
written communications, including opinions and conclusions, between an
employee and a party made subsequent to an occurrence upon which the
lawsuit is based and made in connection with the prosecution, investigation,
or defense of such claim or lawsuit are exempt from discovery. Apparently,
under Barker, an "expert" employee, agent or officer of a party, in the
absence of an unequivocal statement that the expert will not be called as a
witness at trial, is stripped of any testimonial privilege. This qualification to
the general testimonial privilege unnecessarily tortures the literal provisions
of the privilege articulated in rule 167. The testimonial privilege accorded
employees and officers of a party should not be diminished by the expert
witness or consulting expert appellation. In addition, it will now be neces-
sary for the trial court judicially to evaluate and determine, in the first
instance, whether the employee or officer of a party qualifies as an expert.
This particular problem generally does not materialize when a party selects
an independent as an expert to evaluate an occurrence.
Generally, discovery of the records of expert witnesses solely for the
purpose of establishing bias or prejudice is prohibited 6 because such a
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 43.
56. See generally Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970) (court refused to sanction a
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purpose does not satisfy the materiality requirement of good cause. If,
however, the moving party demonstrates materiality, reports of expert
witnesses that relate to transactions or matters other than those involved in
the lawsuit may be discoverable. In Ex parte Shepperd,57 for example, the
condemnees sought reports prepared by the state's appraisers concerning
the value of the land condemned as well as the value of adjacent tracts of
land not involved in the litigation. The condemnees alleged that the apprais-
ers' reports on adjacent tracts of land were essential for preparing an
effective cross-examination and impeachment of the appraisers. The state
responded that under Russell v. Young58 reports of non-party witnesses
which were to be utilized solely for showing bias or prejudice of the witness
were protected from discovery. Distinguishing the Russell case and con-
cluding that the testifying experts' reports concerning adjacent tracts of land
were discoverable, the supreme court stated:
Finally, the reports are not sought solely, or even primarily, to show
bias or prejudice. They are sought as evidence of possible inconsisten-
cies in the appraiser's valuation of other properties which the trial
judges in these cases have determined to be essentially similar to the
subject properties. A thorough exploration, on cross-examination and
re-direct examination, of any such inconsistencies and the reasons
therefor, might well assist the jury in reaching an independent conclu-
sion concerning the fair market value of the subject properties.5 9
The supreme court, however, imposed certain limitations on this type of
pre-trial discovery. The court stated that appraiser's reports involving adja-
cent tracts of land which were still in the negotiation or trial stage were
protected from disclosure. 6° Circumscribed by this qualification, the reports
of the appraisers involving adjacent tracts of land were discoverable.
As delineated in Shepperd6t the guidelines governing production of expert
witness reports are threefold. If the personal records of an expert are sought
solely to establish a possible bias or prejudice of the witness, the reports are
protected from pre-trial discovery. However, in the event the reports of an
expert witness, relating to matters other than the specific matters involved
in the lawsuit, are substantively relevant to the opinions and conclusions
formulated by the witness, the materiality requirement of good cause is
satisfied and the reports are discoverable. Nevertheless, if such examina-
tions and reports of similar products are prepared in connection with other
pending or prospective litigation, the qualification announced in Shepperd6 2
limits pre-trial disclosure.
This issue was further considered in the recent case of Allen v. Hum-
phreys. 63 The plaintiff instituted a workmen's compensation suit against
Safeway Stores, Inc., and its insurers, alleging that she developed lung
party's efforts to compel an examining physician to produce personal financial records to
demonstrate that the witness was plaintiff's doctor).
57. 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974).
58. 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970).
59. 513 S.W.2d at 816 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 817.
61. Id. at 816.
62. Id. at 817.
63. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977).
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cancer from exposure during the course and scope of her employment in the
meat department of a Safeway store to polyvinyl chloride particles released
into the air when meat wrapping film was cut with hot wire. Plaintiff sought
unsuccessfully to discover many items from defendants including: (1) copies
of any surveys or test reports, done by anyone, to determine the amount or
composition of particles released by burning of the plastic meat wrapping
film used by Safeway; (2) all complaints by private individuals and the
Government claiming that cancer had been contracted as a result of breath-
ing polyvinyl chloride fumes; (3) all medical, laboratory, or other expert
reports, not made in connection with plaintiff's claim, dealing with the
possibility that polyvinyl chloride fumes could cause cancer; and (4) all
correspondence, memoranda, safety bulletins, or other communications
reflecting a decision of Safeway to abandon the use of hot wire cutting of
plastic meat wrapping material. 64 The supreme court concluded that the trial
court had abused its discretion in denying substantial amounts of requested
discovery. These tests and surveys were deemed discoverable because they
were not prepared in connection with the prosecution or defense of plain-
tiff's suit.65 The court held that such tests and surveys were discoverable
subject to a showing of need and materiality and to the limitation announced
in Shepperd.6 The court stated:
In Shepperd we held that production of reports prepared by non-
testifying experts in a separate pending suit should not be ordered
produced except upon 'an especially rigorous showing of good cause.'
Finding no such showing here, we hold that relator is not entitled to
produce by discovery any tests and surveys made by experts employed
'solely for consultation' in similar pending suits, if any, against any of
the defendants. However, in connection with other such tests and
surveys, we are persuaded that they would be material to the issue of
causation and that the complexity and substantial expense of conduct-
ing similar tests suffice to show good cause. We therefore hold that,
except insofar as such tests and surveys came within the rule announc-
ed in Shepperd, the trial court abused its discretion in denying this
aspect of relator's motion for discovery. 67
It is important to note that the reports prepared in other litigation that
were involved in Shepperd were prepared by the experts expected to be
called as witnesses in the trial of the pending litigation. Shepperd did not
involve or even consider reports involved in other litigation that were
prepared by "consulting experts" in the pending case. Unquestionably, the
evaluations made by an expert witness in other litigation that directly affect
opinions and conclusions rendered in the pending litigation are extremely
pertinent and should not be exempt from discovery, except as limited by the
guidelines outlined in Shepperd. The same considerations, however, are
totally absent when the reports involved in other litigation were prepared by
a consulting expert who will not provide any evidence or constitute a factor
in the pending litigation. The extension of Shepperd to include prior reports
64. Id. at 470.
65. Id. at 472.
66. 513 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. 1974).
67. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 472 (citations omitted).
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prepared by consulting experts as distinguished from experts expected to be
called as witnesses is unwarranted and, unfortunately, will further confuse
rather than illuminate this area of pre-trial discovery.
As to the requested medical and laboratory reports the court in Hum-
phreys declared:
Subject to the limitations announced by this Court in Sheppard [sic],
these items, too, are discoverable. The reports are directed to the issue
of causation and are unavailable from other sources. The request for
production specifically excludes reports made by Charter Oaks in con-
nection with the investigation or defense of Mrs. Allen's claim. How-
ever, the reports of experts who have been retained solely for consulta-
tion in the instant case are immune from discovery. Similarly, reports of
experts who have been retained in other pending suits of the same
nature and whose reports would be unavailable to the opposing party in
such cases are not discoverable for purposes of the instant case absent
'an especially rigorous showing of good cause.' We find no such show-
ing here. 68
Encompassed within the well established testimonial privilege shielding
opinions and conclusions of consulting experts, 69 are not only the reports of
independent and employee consultants which were prepared for the pending
litigation, but also the consulting expert reports prepared for other pending
although unrelated litigation. 70 The decision in Humphreys, however, great-
ly limits this protective privilege. Apparently, reports of consulting experts
may be discoverable provided the consulting expert has not been employed
in connection with the current litigation, and he has not been employed to
assist in other unrelated but pending litigation in which his opinions and
conclusions would also be protected. 71
Significantly, however, the decision in Shepperd, upon which the court in
Humphreys purported to rely, presented a distinguishable situation. In that
case, the question was whether reports of experts who were to testify at trial
and which bore a material relation to the issues could be discovered even
though not prepared in connection with the instant case. In contrast, the
court in Humphreys held discoverable reports of experts who would not
testify at trial. The explicit basis for the holding in Shepperd-that the
reports were important in ensuring an effective cross-examination of the
testifying experts-was wholly absent in Humphreys. Thus, the decision in
Humphreys represents a significant extension of the Shepperd holding. It
appears that this might be an unfortunate liberalization of the rule. A
consulting expert, whether employed in the pending law suit or in other
unrelated law suits, does not provide any evidence in the trial and, there-
fore, is not a factor in the outcome of the litigation. The rationale for
liberalizing the standards for production of expert reports rests on giving the
adverse party an opportunity to adequately prepare for cross-examination of
expert witnesses. Yet in the instance of a consulting expert who, by defini-
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. See Ex parte Shepperd, 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974); Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunning-
ham, 502 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973).
70. Allen v. Humphreys, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977); Ex parte Shepperd, 513
S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974).
71. Allen v. Humphreys, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977).
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tion, will not be a witness at the trial, this rationale is totally inapplicable.
The protective shield for consulting experts, however, may be limited to the
pending litigation. The net result of the liberalized discovery authorized in
Humphreys will be an onslaught of pretrial motions for production and
discovery with the attendant burdens, costs, and harassment. More im-
portantly, such a rule imposes a substantial burden on trial courts to investi-
gate the origins of the requested consulting expert reports. This introduces
collateral matters to burden further the trial court.
The statements of witnesses obtained in connection with the prosecution
or defense of a claim likewise are not discoverable under rule 167. Prior to
the 1973 amendment rule 167 specifically excluded the statements of witnes-
ses from those matters subject to production.7 2 As a result of the amend-
ment, the exclusionary provision dealing with statements of witnesses was
deleted. Notwithstanding this deletion, the scope of discovery remains
circumscribed by the traditional privilege of post-occurrence investigation
and communications. Consequently, the right of discovery does not extend
to written statements of witnesses in the possession of the other party
obtained subsequent to the occurrence and in connection with the prosecu-
tion or defense of a claim. 73 Clearly, a statement that qualifies under the
post-occurrence criteria is protected from discovery.
Aside from the other provisions, rule 167 authorizes any person, whether
or not a party, to obtain, upon request, a copy of any statement previously
made by that individual which is in the possession, custody, or control of
any party. This pre-emptive right, which extends to any individual who gives
a statement to a litigant, is unencumbered by the good cause requirement
applicable to the remaining provisions of the rule.
Statements and communications prepared or made subsequent to an oc-
currence and in the course of the prosecution or defense of a claim arising
out of such occurrence are protected from discovery. As previously noted,
the identity and location of potential witnesses and parties, and the reports
of experts to be called as witnesses have been specifically removed from
this exempt status by the 1973 amendment. Retained within this traditional
privilege, however, are the following: written statements of witnesses; writ-
ten communications passing between agents, representatives, or employees
of either party to a suit; and communications between a party and his agents,
representatives, and their employees.74 In order to qualify, however, the
communications or written statements must be made subsequent to the
occurrence or transaction and must be made in connection with the prosecu-
tion or defense of the claim. 75 The standards for this traditional privilege
72. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167 (1970).
73. See Keith, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 TEX. B.J. 401, 403 (1973).
74. See generally Neville v. Brewster, 163 Tex. 155, 352 S.W.2d 449 (1961); Munden v.
Chambless, 315 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (privilege must be
asserted before the court).
75. Cf. Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Griffith, 290 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where suit was based on insurer's refusal to pay judgment rendered




were recently reaffirmed by the supreme court in Humphreys. Delineating
the parameters of the privilege, the court declared:
Simply stated, this privilege can be invoked where three factors coexist:
(1) the material sought to be discovered is either (a) a written statement
by a non-expert witness, (b) a written communication between agents,
representatives, or employees of either party to the suit, or (c) written
communications between any party and his agents, representatives, or
their employees; (2) the statement or communication is made subse-
quent to the occurrence or transaction upon which the suit is based; and
(3) the statement or communication is made in connection with the
prosecution, investigation, or defense of the particular suit or in con-
nection with the investigation of the particular circumstances out of
which it arose.
76
The privileged status conferred on post-occurrence investigation and
communications is strictly construed. In the event communications or state-
ments are furnished to third persons, the privilege against disclosure is
waived. 7  The privilege is not waived, however, if the privileged matters are
obtained without the knowledge of the party 7 since waiver requires an
intentional and knowing relinquishment of a privilege.
Photographs made by a party or by experts employed by a party subse-
quent to an occurrence are likewise subject, with some qualification, to
production under rule 167. The term "written communications" has re-
ceived a literal construction. Accordingly, photographs have not qualified as
"written communications passing between agents, representatives or the
employees of either party to the suit or communications between any party
and its agents, representatives or their employees." 79
Frequently, parties and non-party expert witnesses take photographs in
connection with the preparation of a written report. Photographs taken by
parties or their agents are not protected from disclosure. When photographs
are an integral component of the written report of an expert witness they
assume the character of the over-all report of the expert. In Houdaille
Industries, Inc. v. Cunningham, for example, the defendant sought prod-
uction not only of photographs taken by the plaintiff but also photographs
taken by several experts employed by the plaintiff to examine the paving
project involved in the litigation.' Concluding that photographs attached to
expert witness reports assumed the discovery characteristics of the report,
the supreme court commented:
In any event, however, photographs that are a constituent of a bona fide
report in writing of an expert take on the discovery character of the
written report and are governed by the provisions of Rule 167 applicable
76. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 471.
77. In Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the court, in a medical malpractice case, concluded that a doctor who not only sent a
letter to his insurance carrier, but a copy to another doctor not associated with him, had waived
the privilege.
78. Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, no writ) (no waiver of
the privilege in regard to a driver's statement which inadvertently came into possession of the
attorney for the plaintiff). Voluntary and intentional disclosure of the communications and
statements is essential for a waiver. Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Smith v. City of Dallas, 425 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ).
79. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Tex. 1973).
80. Id. at 545.
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thereto, i.e., photographs are subject to discovery, or not, as is the
written report of which they are an integral part.8
The decisions in Houdaille, Shepperd, Barker, and Humphreys define
generally the parameters for production under rule 167. The guidelines
announced in these important decisions provide the fundamental criteria for
judging the discoverability of information sought pursuant to that rule.
C. Sanctions
The penalties for refusal to make discovery pursuant to a court order
under rule 167 are governed by the provisions of rule 170.82 Rule 170
provides alternative sanctions in the event any party, officer, or managing
agent of a party refuses to obey an order issued by the court. These penalties
may include: (1) a determination that designated facts will be taken as
established; (2) a loss of the right to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; (3) a prohibition against introducing into evidence designated
documents, or items of testimony; (4) a striking of all or part of the pleadings
of a party; (5) an abatement of all proceedings pending compliance with the
order of the court; (6) a dismissal of the action or a default judgment against
the refusing party; and (7) other orders which may be just.
The sanctions authorized by rule 170 are available only in connection with
pre-trial discovery under rule 167. 83 In the event the court orders production
of documents or things during the course of a trial, the rule 170 sanctions for
a refusal to comply are inapplicableA8 In the actual trial context, contempt
provides the available means for enforcing compliance with the order of the
court.
The imposition of penalties is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.85 In the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the trial
court may elect to assess any of the penalties enumerated under the rule.
8 6
Penalties may be imposed, however, only after all parties have been furnish-
ed adequate notice of the motion to produce and have been afforded a full
and fair opportunity to be heard.87 Once the party has been afforded a fair
opportunity to be heard and refuses or fails to comply with an order of
81. Id. at 550.
82. TEX. R. Civ. P. 170; See Ramsay v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 498 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dismissed w.o.j., 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
83. The court in American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Texhoma Stores, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 593, 593
(Tex. 1966), specifically noted that the trial court was not authorized to dismiss a cause with
prejudice since the assessment of sanctions for failure to make discovery was confined to pre-
trial proceedings.
84. Id. The court may also prohibit the use of evidence obtained in violation of the terms of
a rule 167 order. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Strickland, 483 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. United States Leasing Corp. v. O'Neill, Price, Anderson & Fouchard, Inc., 553 S.W.2d
II (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ); Texhoma Stores, Inc. v. American
Cent. Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. Thomas v. Thomas, 446 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Railway Express Agency v. Spain, 249 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952), dism'd, 152
Tex. 198, 255 S.W.2d 509 (1953).
87. Thomas v. Thomas, 446 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hollingsworth, 156 Tex. 176, 293 S.W.2d 639 (1956), the supreme
court noted that the penalties provided by rule 170 are harsh and may be imposed only where all
parties are given notice of the motion and are provided a fair opportunity to be heard.
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discovery, the trial court may, in its discretion, either impose or refuse to
impose any of the penalties authorized by rule 170.A
Sanctions are designed to secure compliance with the discovery rules.
They do not serve the function of unnecessarily punishing erring parties.89
Consequently, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss an
action with prejudice for a mere deficiency in form where the erring party
possessed no notice of the deficiency.' The full impact of the available
sanctions entrusted to the trial courts should be reserved for the truly
contumacious party. Willful refusal to comply or an attempt to avoid com-
pliance with authorized and legitimate discovery, however, must be handled
with some degree of harshness. In the absence of meaningful and swiftly
applied sanctions, many parties blithely ignore, and thereby totally frus-
trate, the legitimate pretrial discovery process.
Occasionally a court refuses to order production for a myriad of reasons.
This may precipitate a mandamus action to compel the trial court to order
the requested discovery. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available
only where the party seeking protection demonstrates a violation of a
fundamental right that cannot be corrected or redeemed by any other avail-
able remedy of law. The unique nature of this remedy is clearly illustrated in
Crane v. Tunks91 and Maresca v. Marks.92 In both cases the supreme court
entertained a mandamus proceeding against the trial court for ordering the
wholesale discovery of the income tax returns of a party. Concluding that
the action of the trial court constituted an abuse of discretion, the supreme
court in Maresca noted:
It is self-evident that the maximum protection of privacy is unattainable
if trial courts do not exercise their discretion to safeguard from dis-
covery those portions of income tax returns which are irrelevant and
immaterial, and it is our view that failure to exercise such discretion is
arbitrary action. A litigant so subjected to an invasion of his privacy has
a clear legal right to an extraordinary remedy since there can be no
relief on appeal; privacy once broken by the inspection and copying of
income tax returns by an adversary cannot be retrieved. 93
Recently, the supreme court, relying on Crane and Maresca, has enter-
tained mandamus actions for abuse of discretion by the trial court in refus-
ing to order discovery. In Barker v. Dunham,' the supreme court issued a
mandate ordering the trial court to compel disclosure of certain expert
opinions. The court simply relied upon Crane and Maresca without any
discussion. Shortly thereafter, the supreme court again considered a man-
damus action when the trial court denied a motion for production of infor-
mation in Allen v. Humphreys.95 Relying on Barker, the court concluded
that a mandamus action was an appropriate remedy for an abuse of discre-
tion by the trial court in denying discovery.
88. See, e.g., Hankins v. Haffa, 469 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ).
89. United States Leasing Corp. v. O'Neill, Price, Anderson & Fouchard, Inc., 553 S.W.2d
II, 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
90. Id.
91. 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959).
92. 362 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1962).
93. Id. at 301.
94. 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977).
95. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977).
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The use of the mandamus remedy when discovery has been denied osten-
sibly contravenes the limitation articulated in Pope v. Ferguson96 that man-
damus may not be utilized to correct interlocutory trial court rulings in
which the right of appeal exists. This prohibition against the use of man-
damus when the remedy of appeal is available is entirely consistent with the
supreme court's prior decisions in Crane and Maresca which granted man-
damus to safeguard relators from disclosure of privileged information that
had been ordered produced by the trial court. The basis for the mandamus
relief in Crane and Maresca was the fact that relator was afforded no relief
by appeal because once the privileged information was produced and made
public, it could not be retrieved. This simply is not applicable to a denial of
discovery since appeal constitutes an effective and available remedy. This
distinction was either overlooked or was impliedly repudiated by the su-
preme court in Barker and Allen.
If Barker and Humphreys represent a liberalization of the mandamus
remedy, the supreme court may well anticipate a veritable siege of man-
damus actions. Each time a request for discovery is rebuffed by the trial
court, another petition for mandamus relief will be filed with the supreme
court. Meanwhile the central litigation languishes as the series of mandamus
actions is contested. Therefore, the mandamus remedy should properly be
invoked to protect parties only when discovery of privileged information is
ordered by the trial court and no other effective remedy for protection is
available.
II. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS UNDER RULE 167a
A. General Considerations
The provisions of rule 167a 97 constitute an innovation in the Texas prac-
tice and are patterned, in substantial measure, after the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.98 Rule 167a provides that when the mental or physical
condition of a party or a person under the legal control of a party is in
controversy, the court may order the party to submit to a physical or mental
examination or produce the person under his control for such an examina-
tion. This rule abrogates the landmark case of Austin & North Western
Railroad v. Cluck,99 which rejected the inherent right of a court to order the
physical examination of any party.
Good cause is a prerequisite for obtaining a medical or mental examina-
tion of a party. This means that the moving party must establish not only
that the information requested is necessary and not otherwise available from
other sources, but that the examination is material to some issue in the
litigation. 100
A cause of action seeking damages for personal injuries satisfies the good
96. 445 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997 (1970).
97. TEX. R. CIv. P. 167a.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
99. 97 Tex. 172, 77 S.W. 403 (1903).
100. Johnson v. Logwood, 430 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Texhoma Stores, Inc. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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cause predicate. In Schlagenhauf v. Holder' the United States Supreme
Court considered the issue of good cause in connection with a medical
examination sought under rule 35, the federal rule after which the Texas rule
was patterned. The Court declared:
A plaintiff in a negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury
• . . places that mental or physical injury clearly in controversy and
provides the defendant with good cause for an examination to deter-
mine the existence and extent of such asserted injury. This is not only
true as to a plaintiff, but applies equally to a defendant who asserts his
mental or physical condition as a defense to a claim .... 1
In addition to the good cause requirement, the movant is obligated to
demonstrate that the physical or mental condition of a party is "in con-
troversy" in order to obtain an examination. 103 This means that the mental or
physical condition of a party must be immediately and directly in dispute in
the litigation and not merely incidentally or collaterally involved."° For
example, an injured party seeking damages for traumatically caused diminu-
tion or loss of eyesight clearly brings the condition of his eyesight into
controversy. Conversely, an allegation by the claimant that the defendant
failed to keep a proper lookout does not put the condition of defendant's
eyesight into controversy. If, however, the claimant alleges that the defend-
ant-employer was negligent in employing a truck driver who was blind by
industry standards, then the condition of the driver's eyesight would satisfy
the "in controversy" requirement. The "in controversy" requirement ex-
presses a judicial concern for the historic inviolability of an individual's
right to the privacy of his person.
Even when the "good cause" and "in controversy" requirements are
satisfied, the decision to order an examination is still within the sound
discretion of the trial court. The court's discretion serves as a protection to a
party whose feelings and reputation might be irreparably injured by an
unwarranted disclosure.0 5 Of course, the exercise of discretion is not abso-
lute and unfettered. This is particularly true when the court refuses the
requested examination, as distinguished from ordering an examination,
since discretion is designed to facilitate a full disclosure and not to allow
suppression of material facts.
The movant is obligated to provide notice to the person to be examined
and to all parties. In an ex parte proceeding, where the only notice of a
proposed psychiatric or physical examination is service of a copy of the
motion upon the adversary counsel of record, the provision that notice be
given "to the person to be examined" is not satisfied.06 The purpose of the
notice requirement is to give the person to be examined prior notice and an
101. 379 U.S. 104 (1964); accord, Lewis v. Neighbors Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 308 (W.D.
Mo. 1969).
102. 379 U.S. at 119.
103. C.E. Duke's Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
104. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). See also Stuart v. Burford, 42 F.R.D.
591 (N.D. Okla. 1967); Wadlow v. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
105. See, e.g., Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (N.D. Miss. 1970). See also Bucher
v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
106. See, e.g., Liechty v. Terrill Trucking Co., 53 F.R.D. 590, 591 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
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opportunity to be heard in opposition before the order for mental or physical
examination is issued by the court.10 7
Rule 167a further requires that an order for examination "shall specify the
time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made." In exercising its discretion the
trial court must: (1) set forth the specifications of the examination; 10 8 (2)
designate the time of examination;' °9 (3) determine the examination site;"'
(4) define the conditions and scope of the examination;"' (5) outline the
permissible number of examinations;'1 2 (6) determine whether the examined
party's attorney or physician may be present at the examination;" 3 (7)
appoint the examining physician;1 4 and (8) determine the number of examin-
ing physicians." 5
For purposes of a physical or mental examination, a litigant need not
occupy the status of an opposing party. The right to a physical or mental
examination, upon showing of good cause, extends to any party, including a
co-defendant.1 6 Further, the parents or guardian of a minor claimant may be
ordered to produce the minor plaintiff for an examination. The addition of
the provision "or a person under the legal control of a party" to the federal
rule was, in fact, specifically intended to effect this result." 7 The legal
control contemplated by this rule, however, is ostensibly confined to per-
sons who are parties and in all likelihood does not extend to non-parties."i8
The procedure under this rule must be initiated by one other than the party
to be examined." 9 In addition, absent other compelling considerations, the
moving party is entitled to an examination by a physician of its own choos-
ing.1 20 This is not, however, an absolute right.' 2' The selection of an examin-
107. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Escud6, 179 So. 2d 505, 506-07 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
108. See, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Main v. Tony L. Sheston-
Luxor Cab Co., 249 Iowa 973, 89 N.W.2d 865 (1958).
109. See, e.g., Randolph v. McCoy, 29 F. Supp. 978, 979 (S.D. Tex. 1939).
110. See, e.g., Baird v. Quality Foods, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 212, 213 (E.D. La. 1969); Pierce v.
Brovig, 16 F.R.D. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
111. See, e.g., Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169, 170 (N.D. Ohio 1944).
112. See, e.g., Lewis v. Neighbors Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 308, 309 (W.D. Mo. 1969);
Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387, 389 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
113. See, e.g., Gonzi v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 586, 335 P.2d 97 (1959) (party's attorney
allowed to be present at examination).
114. See, e.g., Stuart v. Burford, 42 F.R.D. 591, 592-93 (N.D. Okla. 1967).
115. See, e.g., Bowing v. Delaware Rayon Co., 38 Del. 206, 190 A. 567, 568-69 (Super. Ct.
1937).
116. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
117. Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement, Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 529 (1970).
118. See Kropp v. General Dynamics Corp., 202 F. Supp. 207 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (court
recognized the absence of power to compel persons not parties to submit to an examination).
But cf. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1964) (person to be examined must be a
party but need not be an adverse party vis-i-vis party seeking the examination). See also Dinsel
v. Penn. R.R., 144 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Pa. 1956). In Dinsel the court held that it had authority to
order an examination of an employee of defendant where the plaintiff alleged that defendant
employer was negligent in permitting the employee to perform work requiring good vision. The
employee, however, was not a party to the suit. Dinsel has been criticized as contrary to the
policy of the rule. 4A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 35-16 n.5 (1970). See generally Advisory
Committee's Explanatory Statement, note 117 supra.
119. C.E. Duke's Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
120. See, e.g., Liechty v. Terrill Trucking Co., 53 F.R.D. 590 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
121. See id.; Stuart v. Burford, 42 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Okla. 1967); The Italia, 27 F. Supp. 785
(E.D.N.Y. 1939).
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ing physician falls within the ambit of judicial discretion.' 22
An order for a physical or mental examination does not foreclose the
court from ordering additional examinations.'2 3 Generally, a second court
ordered examination is warranted when (1) a party suffers multiple injuries
calling for analysis by separate specialties; (2) a change in the condition of
the injured party occurs subsequent to the initial examination; or (3) the
physician examining the party requires consultation with other physicians in
order to reach a diagnosis.124 These additional examinations are governed by
the sound discretion of the trial court. Since the purpose of rule 167a is to
provide both parties with an opportunity to fully evaluate the physical or
mental condition in issue, the court should exercise its discretion liberally in
favor of a sufficient number of examinations to provide the jury with
adequate and comprehensive information.
Rule 167a provides that an examinee must receive on request a copy of a
detailed written report of the examining physician setting out his findings,
including tests, diagnoses, and conclusions. Nevertheless, the written report
required under this rule apparently does not extend to or encompass the
physician's office notes. 2 Thereafter, the party moving for the examination
is likewise entitled, upon request, to receive from the examinee any like
report of any examination previously or subsequently made of the same
condition, unless the examined party shows he is unable to obtain it. The
duty of the examinee to give the moving party all previous and subsequent
medical reports, however, arises only if the examinee first requests and
receives a report. Thus, to qualify for a reciprocal exchange of medical
reports, it appears necessary that the examinee request and receive delivery
of the written report of the physician examining the party pursuant to the
order of the court. 2
6
The provisions of the rule apply to examinations made pursuant to agree-
ment of the parties as well as those undertaken in compliance with the order
of the court. Similarly, the rule does not pre-empt the right of a party to
discovery of a report of a treating physician or the taking of a deposition of
the physician in accordance with other rules.' 27
Unlike its federal counterpart, the Texas rule expressly provides that in
the event no examination is sought, either by agreement or under the rule,
the party whose physical or mental condition is in controversy shall not
comment to the court or jury (I) on his willingness to submit to an examina-
tion; (2) on the right of the other party to request a physical or mental
examination or to move for a court order for such physical or mental
122. See Leach v. Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Miss. 1942);The Italia,
27 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
123. See Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
124. See, e.g., Mayer v. Illinois N. Ry., 324 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
907 (1964); Stuart v. Burford, 42 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Okla. 1967); Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D.
387 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Marshall v. Peters, 31 F.R.D. 238 (S.D. Ohio 1%2); Hildyard v. Western
Fasteners Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 522 P.2d 596 (1974) (recognizing the three bases for a second
examination).
125. See Weir v. Simmons, 233 F. Supp. 657 (D. Neb. 1964).
126. In Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Miss. 1970), the court emphasized the
necessity of a request by the examinee plus delivery of the report as necessary to invoke
reciprocity.
127. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167b(2). See generally Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1961).
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examination; or (3) on the failure of the other party to move or request a
mental or physical examination.12 8 This prohibition was designed to elimi-
nate the practice of the plaintiff commenting to the jury that he has always
been ready and willing to submit to any requested medical examination if the
opposing party contested the extent or effect of the injury. The mandatory
nature of this prohibition was recognized in C. E. Duke's Wrecker Service,
Inc. v. Oakley.'29 The attorney for the plaintiff stated to the jury that "don't
you know they would have got their own doctor, any doctor in this county
. . . or anywhere they wanted to go to examine her if they disputed [the
plaintiff's physical condition].- 130 Concluding that this argument presented
reversible error, the appellate court observed: "The appellants were entitled
to prepare their case for trial on the assumption that the trial court would not
permit the introduction of such evidence. They were not required to antici-
pate that the trial court would fail to follow a mandatory rule of proce-
dure. ' 131
B. Sanctions
Rule 167a fails to provide any sanctions for the refusal of a party to submit
to a physical or mental examination ordered by the court. The provisions of
rule 170 and rule 215a 32 were not amended to govern the failure to comply
with a court order under rule 167a. The federal rule, which is the pattern for
rule 167a, provides specific sanctions for the failure to comply with a court
ordered examination. 133 It would, therefore, appear that the only remedy
available is a contempt action against the refusing party. Significantly,
federal rule 37(b)(2)(D) prohibits use of a contempt action for failure to
comply with an order for a physical or mental examination.
Rule 167a provides that the court may order a party to deliver a report of
physical or mental examinations under terms that the court deems just. 134 If
the physician fails or refuses to prepare a report of the results of an
examination, the court is authorized to exclude the testimony of the physi-
cian when offered at the trial. When confronted with a claimant unwilling to
comply with a court ordered examination, perhaps the court may prohibit
the claimant's physicians from testifying at the trial. This procedure appears
to be the only alternative available to enforce rule 167a discovery orders in
the absence of a specific amendment to either rule 170 or rule 215a.
III. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES UNDER RULE 168
A. General Considerations
Rule 168135 provides that any time after appearance in a cause, a party may
serve written interrogatories to be answered by the adverse party. The party
128. See C.E. Duke's Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 234.
131. Id.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215a.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
134. See generally Chastain v, Evennou, 35 F.R.D. 350, 353 (D. Utah 1964).
135. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
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is required to specify a time for the filing of answers. Under the recent
amendment to rule 168, effective January 1, 1978, the minimum time al-
lowed the answering party has been extended from fifteen to thirty days
after the service of interrogatories.136
The answering party is obligated to supplement answers to interrogatories
when subsequently obtained information demonstrates that: (1) the answer
was incorrect when made; or (2) the answer although correct when made is
no longer true and the failure to amend the answer would constitute a
knowing concealment. 3 7 A party may also be obligated to amend or supple-
ment answers pursuant to an order of the court. This provision effectively
overrules the decision in Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Mitchell, 38 in which the
court announced that the plaintiff was under no duty to advise the defendant
by supplemental answers to interrogatories of additional doctors consulted
by the plaintiff subsequent to answering interrogatories. Therefore, after
proper service of the interrogatories, a party must update and correct
answers with current information as new witnesses are located and addition-
al expert witnesses are employed. The duty to supplement, of course,
depends on the nature and scope of the interrogatories. Interrogatories
requesting the names of all experts expected to be called at trial and the
subject matter about which they are expected to testify undoubtedly impose
on the adverse party a duty to supplement prior to trial. All too frequently
the duty to supplement is interpreted to require, as a predicate, the filing of a
supplemental set of interrogatories. This erroneous presumption is
generated by the failure to recognize the effect of the recent modifications
of rule 168. In fact, rule 168 establishes a continuing duty to supplement in
the event that additional information makes an original answer incorrect or
misleading.
The opposing party is obligated to identify any individuals expected to be
called as expert witnesses. The interrogatory, however, must specifically
request the identity of experts expected to be called at trial. An interroga-
tory that merely requests the names of any and all witnesses expected to be
called at trial is insufficient to require the answering party to provide the
names either of experts or other witnesses expected to testify. 39 It is thus
vitally important that the interrogatory limit the scope of inquiry to experts
expected to be called as witnesses.
Occasionally, a party realizes that an answer to an interrogatory already
filed is erroneous. The trial court possesses the prerogative, upon proper
request, to permit a party to withdraw a previously filed answer to an
interrogatory and to substitute a modified or amended answer. If an answer
is changed, however, the adverse party may utilize the former answer as a
basis for impeachment.140 Inconsistent statements made in response to pre-
136. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
137. Meyerland Co. v. Palais Royal of Houston, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
138. 423 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ).
139. Meyerland Co. v. Palais Royal of Houston, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).




trial discovery occupy no different status for impeachment purposes than
inconsistent written statements made by a party prior to the lawsuit.
If answers to interrogatories may be ascertained from the business re-
cords of the party and the burden of finding the answers is substantially the
same for the party serving the interrogatories as for the party served, it is
sufficient to specify the records from which the answers may be obtained
and to afford the serving party an opportunity to examine and inspect such
records. Prior to the 1973 amendment, rule 186b provided the only protec-
tion against incurring the expense required in searching through voluminous
records. The new provision was designed to alleviate the onerous burden
imposed on parties who would otherwise be compelled to search voluminous
records for the benefit of others.1
41
Compliance, of course, requires the answering party to designate the
specific records or documents that contain the information sought to be
elicited by the interrogatories. 142 The answering party must demonstrate that
the burden of obtaining the information from the records would be substan-
tially the same for both the serving party and the party served. 4 3 This
provision in actual practice is really more of a palliative than a workable
alternative to exhaustive search of voluminous records. It is rare indeed that
a party is willing to give the adversary carte blanche to roam through private
business records and documents. In all likelihood, therefore, the limitations
authorized under rule 186b will remain the most effective protection.
The answers to interrogatories must now be signed by the individual
making the answers. If the party is a corporation or other legal entity, the
officer or agent furnishing the information must sign the answer. This
provision supersedes rule 14 which authorizes the attorney of record for a
party to sign affidavits in behalf of the client.
The rule expressly requires a party to file written objections to the
interrogatories that are not answered. The time allowed an answering party
to file written objections has been extended by the recent amendment to rule
168, effective January 1, 1978, from ten to fifteen days after service.'" The
failure to file objections in accordance with the provisions of the rule
jeopardizes the right to test the propriety of the information sought in the
interrogatory. 45 It has been suggested that the failure to file timely objec-
tions does not waive the protection accorded privileged matters. I46 Most
privileges, however, may be waived. Arguably, a failure to promptly object
as required by rule 168 represents a conscious choice to surrender the
privilege and thereby constitutes a waiver. This is consistent, for example,
with the rule that failure to designate an expert as a consultant who will not
141. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
142. See, e.g., Budget Rent-A-Car of Mo., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 55 F.R.D. 354 (W.D. Mo.
1972); In re Master Key, 53 F.R.D. 87 (D. Conn. 1971).
143. See Thomason v. Leiter, 52 F.R.D. 290 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
144. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
145. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 53 F.R.D. 247 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Bohlin v. Brass Rail, Inc.,
20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Champion Mobil Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
146. See, e.g., Cleminshaw v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 21 F.R.D. 300 (D. Del. 1957). But see
Champion Mobil Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
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be called as a witness waives the right to assert the privilege of non-
disclosure otherwise accorded a consultant.1
47
Another amendment to rule 168, effective January 1, 1978, recommends
that the answering party set out each answer in a space to be provided
immediately following each interrogatory.148 In this manner the document
filed as an answer can be understood without referring to the original set of
interrogatories. This procedure parallels the federal practice and simplifies
the procedure for introducing the interrogatories and answers into evidence
during trial. Answers to interrogatories filed with the clerk of the court do
not automatically become part of the record. Therefore, information con-
tained in answers to interrogatories, in order to constitute evidence of
probative value, must be formally introduced. The use of rule 168 is limited
to pre-trial proceedings. Consequently, rule 168 may not be employed on a
motion for a new trial, or other post-trial matters.1
49
B. Information Discoverable Through Interrogatories
The scope of discovery authorized by rule 168 is coextensive with dis-
covery permitted under rule 186a. Both the latitude of discovery and the
limitations on disclosure are demonstrably affected by the provisions of rule
186a.
The identity and location of any potential party or witness possessing
relevant information is discoverable. Previously, the identity and location of
witnesses or potential parties obtained during a post-occurrence investiga-
tion were privileged. The recent modification of rule 168 effectively over-
rules Ex parte Hanlon, in which the supreme court declared that the name
and address of a witness obtained by a claims investigator subsequent to an
accident and in connection with the defense of a claim was protected from
discovery. This reflects a movement by the supreme court to discourage the
traditional adversary philosophy of trial by ambush and to encourage a fair
and balanced search for the truth.
It is, however, important to distinguish between witnesses possessing
relevant information and those witnesses, other than expert witnesses, that
a party intends to call at the trial. In Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
Co. v. Butler,'5' prior to voir dire examination, the plaintiff requested, and
the trial court ordered, defense counsel to supply the names of all witnesses
that the defendant intended to call at the trial. During the trial, the defend-
ant attempted to call as a witness an individual whose name was not furnish-
ed to the plaintiff and the trial court refused to permit defense counsel to call
the previously unidentified individual as a witness. In condemning the trial
court action, the court of civil appeals observed:
Recent amendments to that and other rules now clearly permit, with
certain limitations the discovery of 'persons, including experts, having
147. Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977).
148. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
149. Vega v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 526 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, no writ); Ana-log, Inc. v. City of Tyler, 520 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no
writ).
150. 406 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. 1966).
151. 511 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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knowledge of relevant facts.' See Rules 167, 168, 170, 186a and 215a.
There is a recognized distinction, however, between 'persons having
knowledge of relevant facts' and 'witnesses who will be called [to
testify] at the trial.' . . . According to the great weight of authority,
pre-trial rules such as ours which permit the discovery of 'persons
having knowledge of relevant facts' (fact witnesses), do not authorize
compelling a party to reveal the witnesses he expects to call at the trial
(persons by whom he expects to prove his cause of action) ....
Various reasons have been advanced in the cases for this rule. It has
been suggested that the forced revelation of the witnesses counsel
expects to use at the trial would violate the 'work product' exemption
recognized by almost all discovery rules, because counsel's decision in
this respect is actually a part of his trial strategy . . . . It has also been
mentioned that contrary interpretation would be difficult to equitably
enforce, as so many unpredictable and uncontrollable circumstances
dictate the use or non-use of a witness at the trial which do not affect
the identity of 'persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
Under the provisions of rules 167 or 168, a party must disclose the identity
of all persons possessing knowledge of relevant facts. A party is not,
however, obligated to disclose the identity of witnesses, other than expert
witnesses, expected to be called at the time of trial. Such disclosure not only
would transgress the work product privilege, 153 but also would unnecessarily
interfere with counsel's tactics and strategy as the trial unfolds.
The mental impressions and opinions of experts utilized solely for consul-
tation and who will not be called as witnesses at the trial also remain
privileged. The federal rule likewise exempts from discovery the mental
impressions, opinions, and conclusions of consulting experts. 5 4 The federal
rule provides, however, that discovery may be obtained upon a showing of
''exceptional circumstances" under which it is impractical for the party
seeking discovery to obtain factual opinions on the same subject by other
means.155 The Texas rule does not incorporate the "exceptional circum-
stances" provision of the federal rule. The supreme court, however, has
judicially formulated a second type of good cause denominated "an espe-
cially rigorous showing of good cause." 56 In adopting the "especially rigor-
ous showing of good cause" standard, the supreme court has acknowledged
that reports prepared by consulting experts for other pending lawsuits could
be deprived of the existing privilege and subjected to discovery. 5, The
judicial adoption of the "especially rigorous showing of good cause" stan-
dard ostensibly injects into the Texas rules a form of the "exceptional
circumstances" standard of the federal rules.
The recent decision in Allen v. Humphreys,158 although involving the
production of documents under rule 167, creates some confusion on the
152. Id. at 324 (citations omitted).
153. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a. See generally Lopresti v. Wells, 515 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ). See also Meyerland Co. v. Palais Royal of Houston, Inc., 557
S.W.2d 534 (Tex, Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
155. Id.
156. Allen v. Humphreys, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469, 472 (July 20, 1977); Exparte Shepperd,
513 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. 1974).
157. See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
158. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 469 (July 20, 1977).
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extent of the privilege shielding consulting expert reports and tests from
other forms of discovery. Clearly, the test and survey results of an expert
employed as a consultant in the pending action are protected from dis-
covery. 159 Individuals protected by this privilege include officers and em-
ployees of a party who are designated as consultants for purposes of the
pending action.'10 In Humphreys, however, the supreme court has nullified
the privileged status of test results, conclusions, and opinions of consulting
experts prepared in other litigation that is not pending. The basis for nullify-
ing this privilege is premised on the fact that such tests or examinations were
not made subsequent to the occurrence in question and were not undertaken
in connection with the prosecution or defense of the pending action; 61
hence, the tests or examinations are not technically within the ambit pre-
scribed by the rules.
The real basis for protecting from disclosure the observations, opinions,
and conclusions of a consulting expert, however, is the fact that the consul-
tant does not provide any evidence in the trial of the case and is not a factor
in the litigation. The same rationale applies with equal vigor to the observa-
tions, opinions, and conclusions of consulting experts in other similar litiga-
tion that has previously been terminated. Qualification of the consulting
expert opinion privilege introduces into the discovery process an unneeded
degree of uncertainty and an invitation to become embroiled in collateral
issues. Either a consulting expert is a consultant or he is an expert expected
to be called as a witness at the trial. It is unfortunate that the court has now
created a hybrid, for purposes of discovery, who is neither a consulting
expert nor a testifying expert. The opinions and conclusions of such a hybrid
expert may now be discovered under either a motion to produce or inter-
rogatories requesting all pertinent data prepared by the consulting expert for
other litigation upon a showing of especially good cause.
The substance of written statements of witnesses that are obtained subse-
quent to an occurrence and made in connection with the prosecution or
defense of a claim remain protected from disclosure. Post-occurrence state-
ments and communications which are made in connection with the investiga-
tion, prosecution, or defense of a claim are accorded a qualified privilege
and are not discoverable under either rule 168 or rule 186a. As a caveat,
however, rule 167 entitles any person, upon request, to obtain a copy of a
statement given by him to any party in the litigation.
Disclosure of the legal contentions of a party are not contemplated by rule
168. Contentions involve ultimate conclusions of fact and law which are
beyond the ambit of a pre-trial discovery. 162 Inquiry into the contentions of a
159. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a; accord, Ex parte Shepperd, 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974);
Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973).
160. Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977).
161. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 472.
162. Cf. Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950) (rule designed to eliminate
matters about which there is no real controversy); White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1964, no writ) (rule extends only to matters of fact and hence does not include
opinions, conclusions, or subjective intent); Gore v. Cunningham, 297 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rule does not contemplate admissions to points of
law). But see Steely & Gayle, Operation of the Discovery Rules, 2 Hous. L. REV. 222, 230
(1964), in which the authors adopt a contrary position.
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party under the federal practice is authorized by the express language of rule
33.163 Unlike federal practice, in Texas the special exceptions provide the
procedural vehicle for compelling a party to particularize contentions and to
clarify imprecisely formulated allegations. Pre-trial determination of eviden-
tiary facts, and not conclusory allegations, undergirds the discovery
process.
Rule 168 is explicit in requiring an answering party to identify each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at the trial and to state the subject
matter concerning which the expert is expected to testify. Prior to 1973, the
identity of expert witnesses and their opinions, conclusions, and findings
were shielded from discovery.' Good cause is not a prerequisite for obtain-
ing information on expert witnesses. The scope of discovery under rule 168,
however, is probably limited to the name of the expert and the subject
matter on which he will testify.
Similarly, the work product of an attorney is protected against discovery.
The work product doctrine was incorporated in the recent amendment to
rule 186a which, of course, extends to rule 168. The work product doctrine
was articulated by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,165 in which the
plaintiff sought to discover from the attorney representing the defendant
memoranda of interviews and written statements of survivors of a tugboat
accident. Although the Supreme Court declared that the information devel-
oped by the defense attorney was not encompassed within the attorney-
client privilege, the court concluded that public policy compelled protection
of the attorney's files against unwarranted incursions by the opposing party.
In defining the work product immunity, the Supreme Court stated: "This
work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, corre-
spondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other
tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case as the 'work product of the lawyer.' ",66 In
Richards-Wilcox Manufacturing Co. v. Young Spring & Wire Corp. the
court observed: "[A]ttorney's work product can generally be defined to
encompass writings, statements or testimony which would substantially
reflect or invade an attorney's legal impressions or legal theories as to a
pending or reasonably anticipated litigation. An attorney's legal impressions
and theories would include his tactics, strategy, opinions and thoughts."1 67
It has been argued that the work product immunity may be waived by
disclosure of the subject matter to a third party. 168 In view of the public
policy rationale designed to prevent unjustified incursions into an attorney's
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) specifically provides that an interrogatory is not objectionable
because it involves an "opinion" or "contention."
164. See, e.g., State v. Ashworth, 484 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1972); Shirley v. Dalby, 384 S.W.2d
362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
166. Id. at 511.
167. 34 F.R.D. 212, 213 (N.D. I11. 1964). See generally In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.
1977).
168. Cf. McCullough Tool Co. v. Pan Geo Atlas Corp., 40 F.R.D. 490 (S.D. Tex. 1966)
(while resting decision on other grounds, court agreed that qualified privilege waived when
attorney allowed third parties to view notes).
1977] 1043
SOUTHWESTERN LA W JOURNAL
files, any waiver of the privilege should be dependent upon a conscious and
deliberate choice.
The rules of discovery, including interrogatory practice, apply with equal
effect to the state. In Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring169 the
plaintiff, a prisoner at the Texas Department of Corrections at Huntsville,
received a facial injury in a basketball game and subsequently lost the sight
of his eye as the result of alleged inadequate medical care and treatment.
The plaintiff served written interrogatories on the Department of Correc-
tions through the attorney general. The attorney general, representing the
Texas Department of Corrections, moved to strike the interrogatories on the
basis that rule 168 did not apply to the state. The state relied on article 4411
which provides that "no admission, agreement or waiver made by the
Attorney General, in any action or suit in which the State is a party shall
prejudice the rights of the State." Overruling a prior court of civil appeals'
opinion'70 the supreme court declared:
Article 4411, the statute relied on by the Court of Civil Appeals in
Harrington [385 S.W.2d 411], prohibits the Attorney General from
making any 'admission, agreement, or waiver' that prejudices the State;
yet Rule 168 operates only to clarify facts. This court does not believe
that the State will be in any way prejudiced by a full revelation of thefacts involved in a case; the Attorney General will not be called upon to
make admissions, agreements and waivers. The Department of Correc-
tions argues that Rule 168 does not refer specifically to the State.
However, other rules of civil procedure referring only to 'parties' have
been applied to the State. Bednarz v. State, supra. Extensive authority
supports the proposition that the State is bound by the rules of civil
procedure unless special provisions provide otherwise.171
The supreme court thus recognized that requiring the state to respond to
interrogatories under rule 168 was not inconsistent with and did not con-
travene the prohibitions imposed by article 4411. When the state is a party,
the Rules of Civil Procedure are, therefore, to be applied to the state as they
would be to any other entity. 172
C. Sanctions
Upon the refusal of a party to answer an interrogatory, rule 168 authorizes
the movant, upon reasonable notice, to apply to the courts for an order
compelling answers to any interrogatory. The rule further provides that the
court is authorized to award reasonable expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, in connection with obtaining the order. If a party further
169. 513 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. 1974). See also Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.1976); Mokry v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 529 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
170. Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 944 (1967).
171. 513 S.W.2d at 8 (emphasis in original). Two justices dissented, arguing that since all
interrogatories must now be answered by the party and rule 168 contains no provision for the
state or its agent to sign, the rule does not apply to the state. Id. at 10 (Walker, J., and Greenhill,
C.J. dissenting).
172. See generally Texas Co. v. State, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83 (1955) (recognizing that
when the state becomes a party, same rules of procedure that govern other litigants apply);
Bednarz v. State, 142 Tex. 138, 176 S.W.2d 562 (1943).
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refuses to comply with the order of the court compelling answers to any
interrogatory, the sanctions of rule 215a(a) and (b) apply.
Under rule 215a(a) the court is authorized to award reasonable costs and
expenses in connection with obtaining the motion and order. This merely
reiterates the sanctions incorporated in rule 168. Rule 215a(b), however,
authorizes the court to impose any of the sanctions enumerated in rule
170.173 These penalties include: (1) ordering that designated facts be estab-
lished in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (2)
prohibiting a party from supporting or opposing designated claims or de-
fenses; (3) prohibiting a party from introducing designated evidence or
testimony; (4) striking a party's pleadings; (5) abating all proceedings; (6)
dismissing the cause of action or rendering a default judgment; or (7)
entering any other order which may be just. 174
If a party refuses or fails to make any response to interrogatories follow-
ing proper service, except for good cause, the court is authorized to impose
the penalties provided in rule 215a(c). Rule 215a(c) authorizes the trial court
to: (1) strike the pleadings of the refusing party; (2) dismiss the cause of
action or proceeding; (3) prohibit a party from presenting grounds for relief
or defense; (4) enter a default judgment against the refusing party; or (5)
make any other order which may be just. 175 The application of these sanc-
tions may be avoided only by a demonstration of good cause. In this context
good cause requires a showing of excusable neglect rather than a conscious
defiance or disregard of the obligation imposed by the rules.
The sanctions for refusal to answer interrogatories under rule 168 are
available only for refusal to comply with pre-trial discovery orders. In
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Butler176 the plaintiff sought,
and the trial court ordered, defense counsel to disclose the names of all
witnesses expected to be called during the trial. When the defendant at-
tempted to call a witness whose name had not been supplied to plaintiff's
counsel, the trial court refused to permit the defendant to call the witness. In
disapproving the trial court action, the appellate court noted:
Even if the Texas discovery rules authorize the forced revelation of the
witnesses by whom a party expects to prove his case, as distinguished
from persons having knowledge of relevant facts, the coercive meas-
ures given by those rules to the trial court to enforce the discovery,
such as the exclusion of items of proof or the dismissal of the action, are
applicable only to pre-trial proceedings, and they are not applicable to
orders made in the course of the actual trial. 77
As earlier noted, a party is obligated by rule 168 to identify each person
173. See generally Pena v. Williams, 547 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no
writ).
174. TEX. R. Civ. P. 170, 215a(b).
175. Id. 215a(c).
176. 511 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. Id. at 325 (emphasis in original); accord, American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Texhoma Stores,
Inc., 401 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1966). In Sherrill v. Estate of Plumley, 514 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the appellate court concluded that the trial
court improperly excluded a document which a party refused to identify in interrogatories
because this sanction is available only after the party seeking discovery obtains an order
compelling answers to the interrogatory and the answering party then fails to comply with the
order of the court.
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expected to be called as an expert witness and to state the subject matter
concerning which the expert is expected to testify. Furthermore, the an-
swering party is obligated to supplement answers to interrogatories if he
obtains information upon the basis of which he knows: (1) the answer was
incorrect when made; or (2) the answer although correct when made is no
longer true and the failure to amend the answer would constitute a knowing
concealment. 78 Frequently, a party answers interrogatories naming all ex-
perts intended to be called as witnesses. Subsequently, and prior to trial,
additional expert witnesses are employed but the answering party fails to file
supplemental answers identifying the additional experts. This results in the
opposing party proceeding to trial unaware of the eventual participation of
one or more additional expert witnesses in the trial. In this situation neither a
contempt action by the trial court nor a motion for mistrial would appear to
provide adequate protection for a failure to comply with the mandate of the
rule. 179
Upon service of proper interrogatories, the requesting party is entitled to
receive the identity and the subject matter of each expert witness the
opposing party expects to call as a witness at the time such expert witness is
initially employed. Because rule 168 specifically imposes on the answering
party the continuing duty to supplement answers,18 0 a failure to supplement
violates this obligation and authorizes the trial court to employ the sanctions
embodied in rule 215a(b), including: prohibiting the party from utilizing the
expert witnesses not identified; striking all or a portion of the pleadings of a
party; or abating the proceedings until the interrogatories have been proper-
ly supplemented. If, however, the sanctions authorized by rule 215a(b) are
not available in these circumstances at the trial stage under the rule an-
nounced in Butler, the purpose and intendment of the amendment to the
rules is totally frustrated. At present, the obligation to supplement imposed
by the rule is routinely circumvented with relative impunity. Therefore, in
the absence of judicial clarification of this obligation, further amendment of
the rules certainly appears warranted.
The provisions of rule 168 seem to create an anomalous situation in the
application of sanctions. When a party fails to answer one or more inter-
rogatories or interposes insupportable objections, sanctions may be invoked
only after the moving party files a motion and obtains an order compelling
an answer and the answering party fails or refuses to comply with this order.
However, when a party fails to make any response to the interrogatories, the
moving party, under the literal language of rule 168, is entitled to seek
sanctions without the necessity of obtaining an order of the trial court
compelling answers to the interrogatories. In view of the harsh penalties
provided by rule 215a(c), it is submitted that the imposition of sanctions
requires an order of the court compelling answers. A party should be
178. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168, 186a.
179. See Texas Employers' Ins. Agency v. Thomas, 517 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1975, no writ), for an example of the dilemma and the frustration occasioned by the
existing hiatus.
180. See AlIright, Inc. v. Yeager, 512 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court emphasized the continuing duty imposed by the rule).
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entitled to a court order outlining precisely the obligations for discovery
before incurring the extremely harsh penalty of dismissal of his cause of
action or the exclusion of highly critical evidence. The requesting party, of
course, is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining the
necessary order.
The selection and assessment of penalties is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.' In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion,
the selection and imposition of penalties by the trial court will not be
disturbed on appeal. 182 It is important to emphasize, however, that sanctions
are designed to secure compliance with discovery procedures and not to
punish the erring party. The imposition of sanctions when a party has
attempted to comply with a discovery order after the time allowed by the
rule, 183 or the imposition of sanctions not specifically authorized, 84 consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion.
The assessment of sanctions requires appropriate notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. 85 Otherwise the avowed purpose of sanctions, to encour-
age compliance and not to punish, is frustrated. The trial court possesses a
degree of latitude and discretion in selecting the particular sanction to be
exercised after a hearing.186
IV. REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS UNDER RULE 169
A. General Considerations
Rule 169187 provides that at any time after the defendant has made an
appearance in a cause a party may deliver a written request for the admis-
sion either of the genuineness of relevant documents or the truth of any
relevant facts set forth in the request. A period of not less than ten days
after delivery of such request for admissions may be designated as a time in
which the answers must be made.'8
Rule 169 is applicable to any party in a civil lawsuit, including the State of
Texas. In Lowe v. Texas Tech University'89 the attorney general, represent-
ing Texas Tech, contended that article 4411, prohibiting the attorney general
from prejudicing the rights of the state by admissions, exempted the state
from application of rule 169. Categorically rejecting this contention, the
supreme court commented:
181. See, e.g., Ebeling v. Gawlik, 487 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1972, no writ) (notwithstanding the harshness of the sanctions, failure to comply with the
court's order entitles the trial court to exercise discretion in imposing authorized sanctions);
Hankins v. Haffa, 469 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ); Fisher v.
Continental 11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
182. Hankins v. Haffa, 469 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ). See
generally Meyer v. Tunks, 360 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1962).
183. Young Cos. v. Bayou Corp., 545 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no
writ).
184. Rainwater v. Haddox, 544 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
185. See, e.g., Hough v. Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, no writ).
186. Hankins v. Haffa, 469 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ).
187. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
188. See Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), where a
request for admissions "within ten days after service" was deemed defective for not following
the requirement of the rule.
189. 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976).
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In Herring, we made clear that the State is not exempt from these
rules of procedure but is subject to them as any other litigant. We
reasoned that Rule 168 of the procedural rules operates to clarify facts;
that the State will not be prejudiced by a revelation of the facts involved
in a case; and that the Attorney General in responding to interrogatories
seeking to elicit such facts will not be called upon to make admissions,
agreements or waivers contrary to art. 4411. Of course, the State enjoys
the same procedural rights under these rules as any other litigant with
respect to the filing and hearing of written objections to interrogatories
upon whatever basis; in addition, the Attorney General may raise for
ruling the further objection that any called for admission, if made,
would prejudice the rights of the State and hence would be ineffective
under the provisions of art. 4411. 1g
The failure either to admit or deny specifically the truth of requested facts
or the genuineness of relevant documents may result in the facts being
deemed admitted or the document being deemed genuine. 191 A refusal to
admit a fact or the genuineness of a relevant document based on lack of
knowledge is not permissible if the information is readily available. 92 Thus,
an evasive response justifies the fact being deemed admitted by the court. 193
Frequently answers to requests for admissions are filed late. Extensive
discretion, of necessity, is conferred on the trial court to determine whether
to deem the requested facts admitted.'" The refusal to deem a fact admitted
when answers have been filed beyond the time designated is subject to
review only for an abuse of discretion. '9 5 Ordinarily, an abuse of discretion
exists only when the legal position of the requesting party is irreparably
prejudiced.
This rule authorizes the court to allow the answering party to withdraw
and file an amended response to the requested admission. Authorization to
permit withdrawal and amendment of an answer is predicated, however, on
a determination by the court that: (1) the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved; and (2) the withdrawal or amendment will not
prejudice the action or defense on the merits of the party who obtained the
admission. The burden of establishing that the merits will be subserved rests
on the answering party while the burden of establishing prejudice is imposed
190. Id. at 301.
191. Firemen's Relief & Retirement Fund v. Fontenot, 446 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lowe v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 423 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); O'Connor v. City of Dallas, 337 S.W.2d 741
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1960, writ dism'd); Masten v. Masten, 165 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1942, writ ref'd).
192. Watson v. Godwin, 425 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
McPeak v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 346 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ).
In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1972), the
supreme court stated that no abuse of discretion was presented where the trial court deemed
requests admitted because the information was readily available from a transcript of another
trial.
193. Drake v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 393 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); McPeak v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 346 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1961, no writ) (court has authority to deem request admitted without a motion); Mont-
gomery v. Gibbens, 245 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, no writ).
194. Smith v. City of Dallas, 404 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), aff'd, 425
S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ); Masten v. Gower, 165 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, no writ).
195. Bickel v. American Trust Life Ins. Co., 468 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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on the party who obtained the admissions. 96 Due notice and a hearing on a
motion to withdraw and amend are essential. Since facts admitted under rule
169 constitute binding judicial admissions that may not be controverted at
trial, it is important for the trial court to ascertain that the merits will be
served by allowing an amended .answer.
Any evidentiary fact admitted under rule 169 is conclusively established
against the admitting party.191 Once a fact is admitted or the genuineness of a
document is acknowledged under rule 169, either specifically or by court
order deeming the fact admitted, the admitting party may not introduce
controverting evidence at the trial or during any other legal proceeding
related to the action.198 The introduction of contradictory evidence is per-
missible only in the event permission has previously been obtained from the
court to withdraw the prior admitted fact.199 Any evidence presented during
the trial inconsistent with a fact previously admitted under rule 169 will not
be considered as probative evidence either in the trial or on appeal. 2°° A rule
169 admission is sufficient to support a summary judgment, a directed
verdict, or a judgment on the verdict of a jury.20'
Because of the binding effect of admissions, the use of admitted facts in
other contexts is severely curtailed. Admissions may not be utilized either in
a prior or subsequent proceeding against the answering party. 20 2 Moreover,
admissions are not admissible against and not binding on other parties in a
multiple party lawsuit. 20 3 Similarly, an admission of a party acting in one
capacity is not binding on the same party occupying other legal capacities in
the pending action. 21
The requesting party may file a motion to determine the sufficiency of the
answers or the reasons for the denial or failure to answer requests for
admissions. On the basis of the hearing, the trial court may either deem the
requests admitted or order the responding party to serve a more responsive
amended answer. The court may also order that the final disposition of the
196. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 459 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); English Freight Co. v. Preston, 203 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ.
App.---Galveston 1947, no writ).
197. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169 specifically declares that "any matter admitted under this rule is
conclusively established as to the party making the admission."
198. Brooks v. Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no
writ); Houston Shoe Hosp. v. State, 423 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, no writ); Hill v. Caparino, 370 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, no writ).
199. Houston Shoe Hosp. v. State, 423 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, no writ); Thornell v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 385 S.W.2d
716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no writ).
200. Thornell v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 385 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no writ); Weaver v. Weaver, 171 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
201. Red Top Taxi Co. v. Snow, 452 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1970, no
writ); Carpenter v. Globe Leasing, Inc., 421 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, no
writ); Hill v. Caparino, 370 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, no writ); Burnett v.
Cory Corp., 352 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Few
v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971).
202. Phillips v. Latham, 433 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1969).
203. Bryant v. Kimmons, 430 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968, no writ); Davis v.
Coastal States Petrochem. Co., 405 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no writ); H.
Richards Oil Co. v. W.S. Luckie, Inc., 391 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
204. Krasa v. Derrico, 193 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1946, no writ).
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requests for admissions be determined at a pre-trial conference or at some
designated time prior to trial.
Requests for admissions are designed to establish uncontroverted eviden-
tiary facts prior to trial. Rule 169 was neither designed nor intended to
secure admissions involving ultimate conclusions of law. In Kirby v. Spit-
zenberger °5 the court emphasized that requests for admissions could not be
utilized to force a party to admit the absence of any cause of action or
grounds of defense.
Answers to requests for admissions may only be used against a party and
cannot be utilized as probative evidence to support the admitting party's
position. 206 Although this rule is well established, the courts frequently
permit parties to read into evidence before the jury their own answers both
to requests for admissions and interrogatories. This is permitted most fre-
quently at hearings on motions for summary judgment. Yet a party's own
answers to requests for admissions of facts will neither support nor defeat a
summary judgment in the absence of independent evidence of probative
value . 207
The trial court is accorded essentially unlimited, discretion to extend the
time for filing answers to requests for admissions even after the time
prescribed for filing has expired. 2' The grant of an extension of time will not
be set aside in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.
2 09 If
the trial court authorizes an extension of time to answer requests for admis-
sions, it may not thereafter revoke the extension in the absence of a showing
of "good cause" for such revocation.21 0 Rule 169 was not designed as a trap
for the unwary but as a tool for the fair disposition of litigation with a
minimum of delay. 21'
Answers to requests for admissions of facts may be considered even if the
answers are not formally introduced into evidence. 21 2 Admitted facts, like
stipulations of the parties, are conclusive against a party after the admis-
sions are filed with the court. Nevertheless, the better practice is to in-
troduce admissions into the factual record for the purpose of bringing to the
attention of the court and jury facts which are important to the ultimate
issues in the action. 21 3 Unlike answers to requests for admissions of facts,
answers to interrogatories under rule 168 must be formally introduced to
205. 514 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Sanders v.
Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950).
206. Sympson v. Mor-Win Producers, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973, no writ).
207. Id.
208. Bynum v. Shatto, 514 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Schindler v. AG Aero Distribs., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1973, no writ). The request for an extension may be oral rather than written. See Bynum v.
Shatto, supra, at 810-11.
209. See generally Meyer v. Tunks, 360 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1962); Fisher v. Continental III.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1958, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
210. Schindler v. AG Aero Distribs. Inc., 502 S.W.2d 561, 584-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1973, no writ).
211. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).





qualify as a part of the record. 14 Answers to interrogatories, however, do
not constitute binding judicial admissions.
Unlike rule 168, which was modified to require the party to sign the
answers to interrogatories, rule 169 remains unchanged. The attorney of
record may answer the requests for admissions provided the answers are
sworn to as true and correct.2"5
B. Sanctions
The penalties imposed for failure to answer requests for admissions are
governed by the specific provisions of rule 169. The failure to answer
requests for admissions or to demonstrate an inability to answer results in
the specified facts being deemed admitted.
Rule 169 further authorizes the court to determine the sufficiency of the
answers to requests for admissions or the reasons for not admitting or
denying the matters requested. The penalties enumerated in rule 215a(a),
providing for award of expenses and attorneys' fees, govern motions to
determine the sufficiency of the answers.
Additional sanctions are incorporated in rule 170. Rule 170 provides for
the award of reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, in the event
that: (1) a party denies a fact or the genuineness of a document that is proven
true or genuine at the trial; or (2) a party arbitrarily refuses to cooperate in
disposing of issues not in bona fide controversy and expenses are incurred in
proving them at the trial.2"6 Although sound in theory, the implementation of
these sanctions is difficult, if not practically impossible.
The assessment of expenses and attorneys' fees as a penalty for failure to
make sufficient answers to requests for admissions is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.2 17 In the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion, the award of expenses and attorneys' fees will not be dis-
turbed.218
V. CONCLUSION
The recent amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have
noticeably liberalized the scope of permissible pre-trial discovery. Despite
this liberalization, the Texas rules, unlike their federal counterparts, retain a
reasonable balance and impose sensible restraints against unnecessary and
unwarranted fishing expeditions. 219
214. Richards v. Boettcher, 518 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
215. H.E. Butt Stores, Inc. v. Vera, 516 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no
writ).
216. Mims v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 362 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1962, no writ).
217. See Fisher v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for an excellent review of enforcing
sanctions for failure to make discovery. See also Hankins v. Haffa, 469 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218. Fisher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. See generally Bryan v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 553 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, no writ); Texhoma Stores, Inc. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 424
S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Under the existing rules, any information relevant to the issues in a
pending action is generally discoverable. Discovery of collateral matters,
except in the confused area of consulting experts, is generally proscribed by
the limitations incorporated in the pre-trial discovery rules. This balance
expedites the disposition of litigation with a corresponding limitation on
unnecessary costs and harassment. The area of greatest confusion remains
in the interpretation and application of the rules. Perhaps more effort should
be devoted to insuring a uniform application of the present rules.
